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I. INTRODUCTION
Extradition1 from the United States is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 31842
and, with limited exception, by treaty.3 Ordinarily, the process is
initiated by a request from the foreign country to the Department of
State.4 Because a formal request is time consuming and a fugitive is

1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 474, at 556-57 (1987) (“Extradition is the process by which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and
returned for trial or punishment.”).
2. Section 3184 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government . . . any justice or judge of the United
States, or any magistrate judge authorized so to do by a court of the United
States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State,
may . . . issue [a] warrant for the apprehension of the person . . . charged [with
having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any
of the crimes provided for by treaty or convention], that he may be brought
before such justice, judge, or magistrate judge, to the end that the evidence of
criminality may be heard and considered.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000); see also United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st
Cir. 1997) (“In the United States, the procedures for extradition are governed by
statute.”).
3. See In re Lahoria, 932 F. Supp. 802, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (“International
extradition proceedings are governed both by statute . . . and by treaty.”); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3181 (2000) (identifying countries with which the United States has bilateral
extradition treaties). Comity is an exception which allows for the return of third country
nationals—persons who are not citizens, nationals, or residents of the United
States—absent a treaty, provided certain conditions are satisfied. § 3181(b); see also
Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 1975) (“International extradition is
governed only by considerations of comity and treaty provisions.”). See generally David
P. Warner, Bringing White-Collar Criminals to Justice—Fugitive Apprehension and
Return and Obtaining Evidence Abroad, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 171, 174 (2003) (“The legal
basis [for extradition], with very limited exception, is grounded on a bilateral or
multilateral treaty.”). There are, of course, other ways to acquire jurisdiction over
fugitives—“[t]he processes of exclusion, deportation, abduction, and rendition or
surrender all play a role, together with the historic practice of informal modes of delivery
of fugitives by one state to another.” Valerie Epps, The Development of the Conceptual
Framework Supporting International Extradition, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
369, 372 n.12 (2003). See generally Ethan A. Nadlemann, The Evolution of United
States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 813, 857-82 (1993) (discussing alternatives to extradition).
4. See Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Extradition is ordinarily initiated by a request from the foreign state to the Department
of State.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 612 (1997), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00612.htm [hereinafter
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL] (discussing role of the State Department); John T. Parry,
No Appeal: The U.S.—U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty’s Effort to Create Federal
Jurisdiction, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 543, 546 (2003) (“Any nation that
has entered into an extradition treaty with the United States may make a formal
diplomatic request for extradition. The State Department reviews the request and
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likely to flee if he learns of it,5 most treaties provide for the provisional
arrest of fugitives in urgent cases while the request is perfected.6 The
Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) reviews
the request for the provisional arrest warrant and, assuming it is
sufficient, forwards it to the United States Attorney for the district where
the person sought to be extradited is located.7 The United States Attorney
then files a complaint in support of an arrest warrant.8 This complaint is
presented to a federal magistrate or judge.9
After the person sought to be extradited is apprehended, the requesting
state provides the United States government with the additional information
required to carry out the extradition under the treaty through a formal
request, which then leads to an extradition hearing.10 If the judicial officer
generally forwards it to the Department of Justice, which sends it to the relevant local
U.S. Attorney’s office.”) (footnote omitted).
5. See Harold Gill Reuschlein, Provisional Arrest and Detention in International
Extradition—A Survey of Practice and Procedure, 23 GEO. L.J. 37, 38 (1934)
(discussing the rationale underlying provisional arrest in international extradition).
6. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-15.230 (1997),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL] (“Because the time involved in preparing a formal
request can be lengthy, most treaties allow for the provisional arrest of fugitives in urgent
cases.”); see also Duran v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“In order
to avoid the flight of a defendant during preparation of a full formal request, many extradition
treaties permit a provisional arrest to be made upon receipt of an informal request.”).
7. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-15.700 (noting how OIA will
review a request for sufficiency and then forward it to the appropriate district); Jeffrey
M. Olson, Note, Gauging an Adequate Probable Cause Standard for Provisional
Arrest in Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 161, 169-70 (1998)
(“The extradition process generally commences when a requesting state issues a
Request for Provisional Arrest to the requested state. The primary purpose of
provisional arrest is to detain fugitives who are likely to flee once they become aware
of proceedings to extradite them.”) (footnotes omitted). If no provisional arrest
warrant is involved, OIA will review the formal requisition and then forward it to the
appropriate district. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-15.230.
8. See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 615 (“[I]n urgent cases,
the prosecutor immediately drafts a complaint for provisional arrest and executes it
before a magistrate judge or district judge in the district where the fugitive is located.
The judicial officer issues a warrant under the authority of the treaty and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184.”).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000).
10. Id. (noting that purpose of apprehension after issuance of warrant is so that the
person charged “may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate judge, to the
end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered.”); Lis Wiehl,
Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional
Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19
MICH. J. INT’L L. 729, 752 (1998) (“[M]ost extradition laws and treaties provide that the
alleged fugitive may be arrested and temporarily detained for a period of time to enable
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“deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge”11—which in
extradition proceedings means probable cause12—then he must certify
the same to the Secretary of State, who will review the case and
determine whether to issue a warrant for the surrender of the person
sought to be extradited.13 Although there is no direct appeal from the

the requesting State to furnish the necessary documentation in support of its request for
his extradition.”) (quoting 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 920
(1968)); Olson, supra note 7, at 172 (“After executing the provisional arrest request, the
requesting state furnishes the United States with any additional information that is
required for extradition under the governing statute and treaty.”).
11. § 3184.
12. See In re Drayer, 190 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1999) (“An extradition
proceeding is not a forum in which to establish[] the guilt or innocence of the accused;
rather, the sole inquiry is into probable cause.”); In re Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 467 (9th Cir.
1998) (“[S]ection 3184 authorizes federal district judges to decide whether there is
probable cause to believe that the potential extraditee committed an offense covered by a
given extradition treaty.”); Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991)
(“In essence, the court must analyze if there is probable cause to believe that the
individual committed acts alleged in the extradition request.”). See generally Steven
Lubet & Morris Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of
Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 198 (1980) (“The requesting
country bears the burden of establishing probable cause to believe that the accused
committed the charged offense.”).
13. See § 3184 (stating a judicial officer “shall certify the same . . . to the Secretary
of State, that a warrant may issue . . . for the surrender of such person . . . .”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3186 (2000) (“The Secretary of State may order the person committed under section[]
3184 . . . to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government.”); see also
Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Secretary of
State has final authority to extradite the fugitive, but is not required to do so. Pursuant to
its authority to conduct foreign affairs, the Executive Branch retains plenary discretion to
refuse extradition.”). Commentators agree that the Secretary of State will seldom reject
an extradition request after a judicial finding of extraditability. See John G. Kester,
Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1486 (1988) (“There is
little incentive for anyone in the State Department to refuse an extradition request after a
court has allowed it. If extradition is then refused by the State Department, it is likely to
be for reasons of policy and expediency rather than considerations of fairness or
extradition doctrine.”); Lubet & Czackes, supra note 12, at 199 (“Despite . . . broad
discretion, the Secretary has in fact seldom overruled a court decision in favor of
extradition.”); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43
VA. J. INT’L L. 93, 96 (2002) (“In practice . . . the Secretary rarely exercises discretion,
perhaps because the needs of diplomacy outweigh the concerns of individuals who may
have committed crimes.”); Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition
Applications, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 277, 288 (2002) (“Although the State Department
has the choice to refuse to extradite, even after a court has issued a certificate of
extraditability, refusal is an exceedingly rare occurrence.”); Elzbieta Klimowicz, Note,
Article 15 of the Torture Convention: Enforcement in U.S. Extradition Proceedings, 15
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 183, 197 (2000) (“[T]he probability of having the Secretary of State
refuse to surrender an extraditable fugitive because of inadmissible evidence is very low.
In fact, in the few instances where the Secretary actually refused to surrender such an
individual, the evidentiary findings of the magistrate were not questioned, only his treaty
construction.”) (footnote omitted).
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magistrate or judge’s decision,14 review of the order is available through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.15
In the last thirty years, one of the legal issues relating to foreign
requests for extradition which has received increasing attention is the
role that “probable cause,” in the Fourth Amendment sense, plays in
connection with the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant.16 In other
words, when the magistrate issues a provisional arrest warrant, must he
find probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime
underlying the extradition request, or probable cause that the fugitive has
been charged with an extraditable crime by the requesting country?
This Article, which is divided into three parts, analyzes the developing
case law in this area.17 First, because the probable cause standard is
found in the Fourth Amendment, the Article briefly analyzes how that
standard has been applied by the courts in criminal cases.18 Next, the
14. See Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1228 n.11 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“There is no direct appeal from extradition decisions.”); Bozilov v. Seifert, 983 F.2d
140, 142 (9th Cir. 1992) (“An extradition order cannot be directly appealed.”); Ahmad v.
Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1065 (2d Cir. 1990) (“An order granting or denying section 3184
certification is not appealable.”).
15. See Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 748 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Decisions
of an extradition court are not directly reviewable but may be challenged collaterally by
a petition for habeas corpus.”); Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2000)
(“Habeas corpus is the normal method of challenging an extradition order, such an order
being unappealable.”). In a habeas proceeding, a petitioner may challenge “whether the
magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offence charged is within the treaty and, by a
somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that
there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.” Fernandez v. Phillips, 268
U.S. 311, 312 (1925); accord Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999);
Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1997); Wigen, 910 F.2d at 1064-65. Under
28 U.S.C. § 2253, a final order in a habeas proceeding is subject to review by the United
States Court of Appeals for the circuit where the district court is located. See In re Artt,
158 F.3d at 468-69.
16. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 744 (“Historically, [one] of the more important
procedural anomalies of the law . . . in extradition[] [has] been . . . the government’s
ability to obtain a provisional arrest warrant for an international fugitive without having
to make an evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed
the crime charged . . . .”).
17. For ease of reference, the Article frequently refers to a fugitive challenging the
request for his or her extradition as “petitioner.” The article also refers to decisions from
United States magistrates and district judges at extradition hearings as decisions of the
“court.” But see Parry, supra note 4, at 550 (“[T]he magistrates and district court judges
who preside over extradition hearings are not ‘courts’ for purposes of Article III,
precisely because their decisions are subject to executive review.”).
18. As further explained in the text below, extradition proceedings are not
considered criminal prosecutions. See Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 543-44 (1st Cir.
1987). The protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, however, apply in
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Article discusses the application of the probable cause standard at
extradition hearings, a practice which is well established. Lastly, the
Article explores how courts have analyzed challenges to provisional
arrest warrants.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.19

The first clause of the amendment is directed against unreasonable
searches and seizures; the second clause establishes that probable cause
is the governing standard for an arrest or search warrant.20
It is well established that searches and seizures “conducted outside the
judicial process, without approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”21 In the criminal
context, to the extent searches and seizures are permitted without a
warrant, they will generally be considered reasonable if supported by
probable cause.22
both the criminal and the civil context. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530
(1967) (“It is . . . anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior.”); Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 647 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(“[A] ‘seizure’ may occur in both civil and criminal contexts.”).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. See Freeman, 242 F.3d at 648 (noting existence of “two separate and
independent clauses” and that “[n]othing in the text suggests that warrants are required
for every search or seizure, nor is the existence of a warrant a sine qua non for a
reasonable search or seizure. . . .”); see also United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 799
(7th Cir. 2001) (“During the last 50 years the Supreme Court has understood the [first]
clause of the fourth amendment . . . to require warrants in some circumstances as essential to
the ‘reasonableness’ of particularly intrusive searches, such as those into dwellings.”).
See generally Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”:
Suspicionless Searches, “Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 508
(2004) (“[O]ngoing debate [exists] over whether the ‘reasonableness’ or the ‘warrant’
clause should have primacy in interpreting how the Fourth Amendment should be
applied.”).
21. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
22. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1(a), at 4-5 (3d ed. 1996).
Exigent circumstances will support a warrantless search and seizure if there is probable
cause for the intrusion. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41-42 (1963). A warrant also
is not necessary to search a car if the police have probable cause to believe that it
contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-49
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The Supreme Court has observed that the probable cause standard “is
a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that
has been found for accommodating . . . often opposing interests.”23 In
other words, “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment
of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”24 These probabilities “are
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what
must be proved.”25
While probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search “contain
different inquiries,”26 it has been “generally assumed by the Supreme
Court and the lower courts that the same quantum of evidence is required
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause
to search.”27 Additionally, “the standards applicable to the factual basis
supporting the officer’s probable-cause assessment at the time of the
(1970). Similarly, the police may arrest a person without first procuring a warrant if they
have probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975).
Some searches and seizures are not subject to probable cause or the warrant
requirement. The police, for example, may briefly detain and frisk a person for
investigative purposes, without a warrant or probable cause, if they have a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person may be armed and
presently dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Routine searches at the
border are not subject to any warrant requirement, probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985). A
search incident to an arrest does not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). Searches conducted pursuant to
consent do not require a warrant or probable cause. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Lastly, outside the criminal context, “special needs” may make
the probable cause and warrant requirement impracticable. See City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
24. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.
366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the
totality of the circumstances.”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)
(noting that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are “fluid concepts that take their
substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being
assessed.”).
25. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
26. Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996).
27. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.1(b), at 6. As a result, “discussions by courts of
the probable cause requirement often refer to and rely upon prior decisions without
regard to whether these earlier cases were concerned with the grounds to arrest or the
grounds to search.” Id.
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challenged arrest and search are at least as stringent as the standards
applied with respect to the magistrate’s assessment” when confronted
with a request for a warrant.28
In the context of a search warrant, the Supreme Court ruled in Illinois
v. Gates29 that the determination of probable cause involves a practical,
common sense decision as to whether, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.”30 In other words, “probable
cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”31
In the context of an arrest, with or without a warrant,32 probable cause
has been found to be present when “the facts and circumstances” known
to the law enforcement officer are “sufficient to warrant a prudent [person]
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an
offense.”33 Probable cause to arrest “does not require indubitable or
necessarily convincing evidence,”34 or facts necessary to establish a
conviction,35 or “a prima facie showing of criminal activity,”36 or “even
evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect
committed a crime.”37 What is required is a “fair probability” that the
28. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971).
29. Gates, 462 U.S. at 213.
30. Id. at 238.
31. Id. at 244 n.13; accord United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 784 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Goddard, 312 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2002).
32. See United States v. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. 94, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The
probable cause necessary for a warrantless arrest is neither greater than nor lesser than
that needed for a magistrate to issue a warrant . . . .”).
33. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (“The quantum of information which constitutes probable
cause—evidence which would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that a
felony has been committed—must be measured by the facts of the particular case.”)
(citation omitted); accord United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gordon, 231
F.3d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
34. Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985).
35. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Morris, 247 F.3d at
1088; United States v. Reyes, 225 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Gray, 137
F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998); Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 n.9 (11th Cir.
1990).
36. Tokar v. Bowersox, 198 F.3d 1039, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United
States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1987) (“In order to establish probable cause, it is
not necessary to make a ‘prima facie showing of criminal activity’ or to demonstrate that
it is more probable than not that a crime has been or is being committed.”).
37. United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Piazza v.
Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[P]robable cause ‘does not demand any
showing that [the belief that an offense was committed] be correct or more likely true
than false.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742
(1983)); United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Probable cause
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suspect has committed, or is committing, a crime.38 That probability is
measured in terms of “something more than a bare suspicion, but need
not reach the fifty percent mark.”39
But probable cause to arrest or search can also arise outside the
domestic criminal warrant context. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 3144,40
the federal material witnesses statute, a warrant for the arrest of a
material witness will issue if there has been a showing, by way of
affidavit41 and based on probable cause, that the witness has material
knowledge of a crime, and that his or her presence is unlikely to be
requires more than bare suspicion but need not be based on evidence sufficient to support
a conviction, nor even a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true than false.”);
United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1192 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Probable cause . . . does
not require any showing that the officer’s suspicions prove to be correct or that they are
more likely true than false.”).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999).
39. United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1999); see United States v.
Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[P]robable cause standard does not
require the officers’ conclusion to be ironclad, or even highly probable. Their
conclusion that probable cause exists need only be reasonable.”); Samos Imex Corp. v.
Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 194 F.3d 301, 303 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The phrase ‘probable cause’
is used, in the narrow confines of Fourth Amendment precedent, to establish a standard
less demanding than ‘more probable than not.’”); Roberts v. Hochstetler, 592 F. Supp.
703, 712 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (“[T]he proof for probable cause does not approach the level
of proof needed for guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the
evidence.”); cf. Garcia, 179 F.3d at 269 (noting that probable cause to arrest does not
mean that “a reasonable person would have thought, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a defendant committed a crime.”).
40. Section 3144 provides:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is
material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial
officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance
with the provisions of section 3142 [The Bail Reform Act] of this title. No
material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any
condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured
by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of
justice. Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period
of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
41. See United States v. Fuentes-Galindo, 929 F.2d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir. 1991)
(“Prior to commencing the procedure delineated in § 3144, a party must file an affidavit
establishing that the circumstances contemplated in that section are present.”). But see
Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 66 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing how the Assistant
United States Attorney obtained a material witness warrant “without the affidavit
required by Section 3149”). Section 3149 is the surety bond provision for section 3144.
See § 3144; 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (2000).
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achieved by subpoena.42 This requirement is necessary because “the
arrest and detention of a potential witness is just as much an invasion of
the person’s security as if she had been arrested on a criminal charge.”43
An example of the application of the probable cause standard outside
the domestic criminal warrant context with respect to a search is found
in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).44 Under FISA, a
special court, composed of eleven federal district court judges
designated by the Chief Justice,45 may issue a surveillance warrant if it
finds, in addition to certain other requirements, that there is probable
cause that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power” and that the place or facility at which the
surveillance will be “directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”46 With this discussion of
probable cause to search and seize in place, we now turn to a brief
examination of the nature of, and the procedures governing, the hearing
governing a foreign request for extradition.47

42. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n
application for a material witness warrant under § 3144 must establish probable cause to
believe that (1) the witness’s testimony is material, and (2) it may become impracticable
to secure the presence of the witness by subpoena.”); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d
933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
43. Perkins v. Click, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (D.N.M. 2001). After arrest, a
material witness may be released on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance
bond, released subject to certain conditions, or detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)-(c), (e)
(2000).
44. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000 & Supp. III 2003). As the court observed in
ACLU Foundation of Southern California, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991):
By enacting FISA, Congress sought to resolve doubts about the constitutionality of
warrantless, foreign security surveillance and yet protect the interests of the
United States in obtaining vital intelligence about foreign powers. FISA thus
created a “secure framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct
legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the
context of this Nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.”
Id. at 461 (citation omitted).
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2004).
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000); see also United States v. Squillacote,
221 F.3d 542, 553 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing requirements); United States v. Megahey,
553 F. Supp. 1180, 1183-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). This articulation of probable cause in the
national security context is not surprising. Prior to the enactment of FISA, the Supreme
Court recognized in United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972):
Different standards [of probable cause] may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of
Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our
citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the governmental
interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.
Id. at 322-23.
47. As noted earlier, in many cases, the detention is likely to be triggered by a
request for a provisional arrest warrant. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
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III. THE EXTRADITION HEARING
While extradition proceedings are sui generis48 and are not considered
criminal prosecutions,49 they are, to some degree, analogous to preliminary
hearings.50 Thus, the governing standard at extradition hearings, established
by federal law,51 is probable cause.52 At an extradition hearing, the
48. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 498 n.9 (2d Cir. 1986)
(“[E]xtradition proceedings are sui generis . . . .”); In re Munguia, 294 F. Supp. 2d 893,
895 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“[E]ach separate extradition treaty between the United States of
America and a foreign nation is sui generis, and as a contract between two sovereigns,
sets forth its own law.”).
49. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Extradition . . . is
not a ‘criminal prosecution.’”); Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A]n
extradition hearing is not a criminal prosecution: the order of extraditability expresses no
judgment on [petitioner’s] guilt or innocence.”). As the court observed in In re Garcia,
188 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2002), numerous constitutional protections applicable to
criminal proceedings are not present when extradition is involved:
For example, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fifth
Amendment right against undue delay are inapplicable to an extradition.
Likewise, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel does not apply to
extradition proceedings. The Supreme Court has found no constitutional
infirmity where those subject to extradition proceedings have been denied an
opportunity to confront their accusers. Finally, the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy and the right to a Miranda warning are
inapplicable to an extradition proceeding.
Id. at 933 (citations omitted); see also Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 828-30 (11th
Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that there is a constitutional right under the Fifth
Amendment’s due process clause to a “speedy extradition”).
50. See Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (noting that an extradition
proceeding is “of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every
day in this country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose of
determining whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused”);
David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[A]n extradition hearing
is of the character of a preliminary hearing and is not to be converted into a full-dress
trial.”) (citations omitted).
51. See Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he probable cause
standard applicable in extradition proceedings is identical to that used by courts in
federal preliminary hearings.”); Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir.
1993) (“Before [petitioner] can be certified for extradition, a court must find probable
cause under federal law that he committed the offense he is charged with by the [foreign]
government.”); Castro Bobadilla v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (“In
extradition proceedings, probable cause is measured by the federal standard used in
preliminary proceedings.”). But see In re Schweidenback, 3 F. Supp. 2d 113, 116 (D.
Mass. 1998) (“[I]t is the state standard of probable cause that is the appropriate one to be
applied.”).
52. See Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. 1962) (“With respect
to the evidence upon which the extradition magistrate acted, it must be remembered that
the extradition magistrate merely determines probable cause, making an inquiry like that
of a committing magistrate and no more.”); accord Polo v. Horgan, 828 F. Supp. 961,
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probable cause standard is defined as “evidence sufficient to cause a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a
reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt,”53 or “the existence of a
reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”54 In other words, the
magistrate’s role at the extradition hearing is “to determine whether
there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial,
and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a
conviction.”55
The judicial officer presiding over the extradition hearing “has wide
latitude in admitting evidence.”56 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules
of Evidence do not apply.57 A person whose extradition is sought has no
right to cross-examine witnesses at an extradition hearing58 and there is
no obligation on the part of the government to provide discovery or

965 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (“To certify an extradition warrant, a magistrate need only find
probable cause that ‘the evidence [is] sufficient to sustain the charge.’”); In re Ryan, 360
F. Supp. 270, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (“The extraditing magistrate’s function is to
determine whether there is any evidence sufficient to establish reasonable or probable
cause to believe that the detainee committed the crimes charged.”).
53. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord In re
Garcia, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 932; Sidali, 107 F.3d at 199.
54. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980); accord
Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1931) (“[The magistrate must] determine
whether upon the evidence adduced before him there is reasonable ground to believe that
the crime charged has been committed . . . .”); In re Cervantes Valles, 268 F. Supp. 2d
758, 772 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“Probable cause is the existence of reasonable grounds to
believe the accused committed the offense charged.”).
55. Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Collins v. Loisel,
259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922)); cf. In re Chan Seong-I, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1161 (D.N.M.
2004) (“The evidence showing probable cause need not be sufficient evidence to support
a conviction, but need only be sufficient to warrant a finding that there are reasonable
grounds to believe the relator is guilty and thus hold her for trial.”); Ward v. Rutherford,
921 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[The extradition hearing is] essentially a
‘preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made out which will justify the
holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding nation.’”).
56. In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1219 (S.D. Cal. 1997); see also In re
Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Admission of evidence in an
international extradition proceeding is within the magistrate’s discretion.”).
57. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5) (“These rules are not applicable to extradition
and rendition of fugitives . . . .”); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (“The rules . . . do not
apply . . . [to] [p]roceedings for extradition or rendition . . . .”); In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711,
720-21 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he rules of evidence and civil procedure that govern federal
court proceedings heard under the authority of Article III of the United States
Constitution do not apply in extradition hearings that are conducted under the authority
of a treaty enacted pursuant to Article II.”).
58. See Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984) (“As in the case
of a grand jury proceeding, a defendant has no right to cross-examine witnesses or
introduce evidence to rebut that of the prosecutor.”).
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produce exculpatory evidence.59 Credibility determinations are the
province of the extraditing judicial officer60 and the evidence at an
extradition hearing may consist of hearsay.61 Furthermore, section 3190
permits the demanding country to introduce properly authenticated
evidence gathered at home62 and the defenses available to one sought to
be extradited are limited. For example, “evidence of alibi or of facts
contradicting the demanding country’s proof or of a defense such as
insanity may properly be excluded . . . .”63 Accomplice testimony,64 or a
59. See Montemayor Seguy v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (S.D. Tex.
2004) (“The extradition law, the extradition treaty, and the United States Constitution do
not require production of exculpatory evidence at an extradition hearing.”); Prasoprat v.
Benov, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[A] fugitive in an extradition case
has no right to discovery.”). But see Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353-54 (6th
Cir. 1993) (recognizing that government must provide exculpatory evidence where it has
conducted its own investigation of the offense underlying the extradition request and
uncovered exculpatory information); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“Although there is no explicit statutory basis for ordering discovery in
extradition hearings, the extradition magistrate has the right, under the court’s ‘inherent
power,’ to order such discovery procedures ‘as law and justice require.’”) (citations
omitted).
60. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 815 (“The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be
accorded their testimony is solely within the province of the extradition magistrate.”).
61. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922) (“[U]nsworn statements of
absent witnesses may be acted upon by the committing magistrate, although they could
not have been received by him under the law of the State on a preliminary
examination.”); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The
evidence may consist . . . entirely of hearsay.”); In re Then, 92 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.
1996) (“[H]earsay evidence is admissible to support a probable cause determination in an
extradition hearing . . . .”); Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“Hearsay evidence is admissible.”).
62. Section 3190, which is captioned “Evidence on hearing,” states:
Depositions, warrants or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence
upon the hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as
evidence on such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be
properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for
similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which the
accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic
or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall
be proof that the same, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required.
18 U.S.C. § 3190 (2000).
63. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Hooker v.
Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting alibi or other evidence contradicting
proof of probable cause inadmissible); United States v. Peterka, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1344,
1349 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (“[E]xtraditees may only introduce evidence to explain rather
than contradict the evidence presented by the Government, and the court shall exclude
evidence that is proffered to contradict testimony, challenge the credibility of witnesses,
or establish a defense to the crimes alleged.”); In re Cervantes Valles, 268 F. Supp. 2d
758, 772 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“[T]he accused has no right to present a defense to the
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certified copy of a foreign conviction upon which the extradition request
is based, have been held sufficient to establish probable cause.65 Of
course, the evidence presented must establish that the person sought to
be extradited is the one who has been charged or convicted of the
crime(s) alleged in the extradition request.66 Ultimately, a certificate of
extradition will issue if the judicial officer had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the person sought to be extradited, the offense for
which extradition was sought was an extraditable offense under a treaty
in effect at the time of the request, and competent evidence is presented
sufficient to establish probable cause that the extraditee committed the
alleged offense.67

charges against him, such as an alibi defense, and has no right to introduce evidence
which merely contradicts the demanding country’s proof, or which only poses conflicts
of credibility.”); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (“Evidence
that conflicts with that submitted on behalf of the demanding party is not permitted, nor
is impeachment of the credibility of the demanding country’s witnesses.”); Powers,
supra note 13, at 312-13 (discussing the rule of noncontradiction).
64. See Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Accomplice
testimony can be used to find probable cause . . . .”); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. at 1227
(“[S]elf incriminating statements of accomplices are sufficient to establish probable
cause in an extradition hearing.”); In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(“[T]he accomplice testimony evidence, which is, under the rules governing extradition
proceedings, deemed credible even without corroboration, sufficiently demonstrates that
probable cause exists to support the certification of [petitioner] for extradition.”). For
cases discussing how the recantation of accomplice testimony may affect the probable
cause analysis, see Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 510-12 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Atuar,
300 F. Supp. 2d 418, 427-31, 434-35 (S.D. W.Va. 2003); In re Strunk, 293 F. Supp. 2d
1117, 1125-26 (E.D. Cal. 2003); United States v. Linson, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (D.
Guam 2000); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. at 1221-26; In re Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914,
923-24 (S.D. Cal. 1994); In re Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462, 1464-69 (S.D. Tex. 1992);
Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1044-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Republic of Fr. v.
Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 782-84 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
65. See Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] certified
copy of a foreign conviction, obtained following a trial at which the defendant was
present, is sufficient to sustain a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause
exists to extradite.”).
66. See Noel v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1304 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(identification based on birthday, nationality, and appearance in photograph); cf. In re De
Jesus Alatorre Pliego, 320 F. Supp. 2d 947, 950-51 (D. Ariz. 2004) (“[T]here is no
probable cause to believe that the [person] who was arrested and sitting in the courtroom
at the extradition hearing is the person that was identified by the witnesses as committing
the fraud.”); In re Cervantes Valles, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (“This is a textbook case of
mistaken identity, and the governments of the U.S. and Mexico, in the interests of
justice, ought to have conceded that fact.”).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000); see In re Atuar, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26
(identifying factors); In re Fulgencio Garcia, 188 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. at 1216. See generally Powers, supra note 13, at 290
(discussing factors).
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IV. PROVISIONAL ARREST
The first American treaties allowing for provisional arrest were
entered into with the Netherlands and Russia in 1887.68 This practice
continued and modern extradition treaties generally allow the provisional
arrest of the person sought to be extradited if urgent circumstances are
present.69 Urgent circumstances “may include the fact that the fugitive
is a flight risk, is in country for only a short period of time, or is deemed
to be a danger to society.”70 Section 3184 provides for the issuance of a
warrant “upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found
within [the magistrate or judge’s] jurisdiction, with having committed
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by . . . treaty or convention . . . .”71 But must the judge or
magistrate also make an independent determination that there is probable
cause for the arrest of the fugitive under the standard applicable to
domestic criminal warrants? If so, what type of evidence is sufficient?
Or, should probable cause in the context of provisional arrest warrants
be measured not against the fair probability that a fugitive has
committed a criminal offense, but rather, by facts demonstrating the
existence of a treaty and an arrest warrant for such fugitive by the
requesting country based on an offense found under the treaty? We
begin our discussion with Supreme Court cases which analyzed the
sufficiency of the complaint to support a warrant under section 3184’s
predecessor. We then turn to the more recent cases which explicitly or
implicitly have addressed the Fourth Amendment question.

68. See Reuschlein, supra note 5, at 44-45. “Well before the beginning of the final
decade of the nineteenth century, articles providing for provisional arrest had very
definitely come into general acceptance and in virtually all treaties negotiated between
the several nations these articles are to be found.” Id. at 46.
69. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-15.230 (“Every extradition
treaty to which the United States is a party requires a formal request for extradition,
supported by appropriate documents. Because the time involved in preparing a formal
request can be lengthy, most treaties allow for the provisional arrest of fugitives in
urgent cases.”); Kester, supra note 13, at 1464 (“Most extradition treaties contain a
clause permitting the ‘provisional arrest’ of the person sought, for a limited time pending
completion of a formal extradition request, if there is urgency, usually because of a
danger or likelihood of imminent flight.”). If the extradition request is made at the same
time or before the arrest warrant is sought, the warrant is not deemed provisional. See
Wiehl, supra note 10, at 733 n.7.
70. 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1631.1-1(a) (2005),
available at http://foia.state.gov/Regs/fams.asp?level=2&id=8&fam=0.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000).
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A. Early Cases
Between 1901 and 1925, the Supreme Court decided five cases
addressing the sufficiency of an extradition complaint under section
5270 of the Revised Statutes, the predecessor to section 3184.72 The
first of these cases was Rice v. Ames,73 where the Court ruled that an
officer of a foreign government could present a “complaint upon
information and belief, stating the sources of his information and the
grounds of his belief, and annexing to the complaint a properly certified
copy of any indictment or equivalent proceeding . . . or a copy of the
depositions of witnesses having actual knowledge of the facts . . . .”74
One year later, in Grin v. Shine,75 the Court observed that a complaint
under oath could “be made by any person acting under the authority of
the foreign government having knowledge of the facts, or, in the absence

72. The original law was passed in 1848. See Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9
Stat. 302. In 1878, section 1 of this act became section 5270 of the Revised Statutes.
See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 731 n.2. Section 5270 provided:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the
Government of the United States and any foreign government, any justice of
the Supreme Court, circuit judge, district judge, commissioner, authorized so
to do by any of the courts of the United States, or judge of a court of record of
general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within the limits of any State, district, or Territory,
with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government
any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant
for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before
such justice, judge, or commissioner, to the end that the evidence of criminality
may he heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence
sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or
convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony
taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the
requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the
surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or
convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so
charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made.
In 1940, section 5270 became codified at 18 U.S.C. § 651 and in 1948, it became 18
U.S.C. § 3184. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 731 n.2. In 1968, the Federal Magistrate
Acts changed the term “commissioner” to “magistrate” in section 3184. See Federal
Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 301(a)(3), 82 Stat. 1115 (1968). One
commentator has noted that “[a]lthough the language has been corrected, modernized,
and slightly amended, the 1848 statute continues to govern extradition proceedings
today.” Parry, supra note 13, 134-35; see Powers, supra note 13, at 282 (“Although the
statute has been amended . . . it remains substantially similar to the one enacted over a
century and a half ago.”).
73. 180 U.S. 371 (1901).
74. Id. at 375-76.
75. 187 U.S. 181 (1902).
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of such person, by the official representative of the foreign government
based upon depositions in his possession . . . .”76
Several years later, in Yordi v. Nolte,77 the Court again confronted the
sufficiency of an extradition complaint. In Yordi, Mexico’s consul
presented a complaint for petitioner’s arrest for fraud and forgery of
documents.78 The complaint was based on information and belief.79 At
the time the consul made the complaint, however, he had before him the
record of the proceedings in Mexico relating to the offense and the
depositions of witnesses.80 Rejecting the contention that the complaint
was deficient because it had no evidentiary attachments, the Court held
that the record from Mexico had been before the commissioner when the
warrant was issued and such record “corrected any irregularity in the
complaint.”81
76. Id. at 193. Some commentators have noted that Grin could be interpreted as a
retreat from Rice with respect to the sufficiency of the extradition complaint. See
Angelo M. Russo, Note, The Development of Foreign Extradition Takes a Wrong Turn
in Light of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: Ninth Circuit Vacates the Requirement
of Probable Cause for a Provisional Arrest in Parretti v. United States, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1041, 1056 (2000) (“The significant difference between the Grin and Rice opinions
was the requirement of supplemental evidence. The Court in Grin did not specify
whether the depositions were to be sent directly to the judge or if it was sufficient for the
representative to inform the judge of their presence.”); Wiehl, supra note 10, at 747
(“The Grin Court did not indicate whether the issuing U.S. magistrate ought to see
copies of these depositions before issuing a warrant, or whether it was sufficient that the
magistrate merely be assured that the foreign authorities had such depositions in their
possession before they made their complaint.”).
77. 215 U.S. 227 (1909).
78. Id. at 228.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 232. “This record from Mexico was not only before the Mexican consul
when he made the complaint against Yordi, now under consideration, but the commissioner
was thoroughly familiar with it, as it had been introduced in evidence before him upon
the hearing of the first complaint.” Id. at 229-30. In Yordi, the Court observed:
The complaint may, in some instances, be upon information and belief. The
exigencies may be such that the criminal may escape punishment unless he is
promptly apprehended by the representatives of the country whose law he has
violated. From the very nature of the case it may often happen that such
representative can have no personal knowledge of the crime. If the offense be
one of the treaty crimes, and if it be stated clearly and explicitly so that the
accused knows exactly what the charge is, the complaint is sufficient to
authorize the commissioner to act.
Id. at 230-31 (quoting Ex parte Sternaman, 77 F. 595, 597 (N.D.N.Y. 1896)). However,
in light of Yordi’s recognition that the record from Mexico was before the magistrate at
the time of the issuance of the warrant, it has been suggested that “the case can be read
for the proposition that an arrest warrant application in an extradition case should be

363

IRAOLA.DOC

8/29/2006 1:45 PM

The last two cases touching on the sufficiency of extradition complaints
during this period are Glucksman v. Henkel 82 and Fernandez v.
Phillips.83 In Glucksman, the Court, citing Rice, ruled that while the
complaint was on information and belief, it was “supported by the
testimony of witnesses who [were] stated to have [been] deposed,” and
therefore, presumably sworn.84 In Fernandez, the complaint was based
on information obtained through diplomatic channels that petitioner had
been charged with embezzlement of public funds in Mexico.85 In
rejecting the contention that the complaint had been defective, the Court
noted that appended to it was a copy of the proceedings in the Mexican
court establishing the commission of the crime and ordering his arrest.86
This evidence, according to the Court, was present at the extradition
hearing.87
When testing the sufficiency of the complaint in Rice, Grin, Yordi,
Glucksman, and Fernandez, the Court did not mention, much less rely
upon, the Fourth Amendment. The focus of these cases, none of which
appear to have involved provisional arrest warrants, was whether the
complaint could be based on information and belief, and if it was, the
evidentiary support necessary to render the complaint legally sufficient.88
Whether the complaint needed to establish anything more than the fact
based upon some form of attached deposition or documentary evidence and not merely a
government lawyer’s allegations on information and belief.” Wiehl, supra note 10, at
747.
82. 221 U.S. 508 (1911).
83. 268 U.S. 311 (1925).
84. Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 514.
85. Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 313.
86. Id.
87. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated:
Of course, whatever form of words was used, the complaint necessarily was
upon information, but as appeared at the hearing it was filed by order of the
Attorney General, upon request of the Secretary of State, enclosing a request
for the extradition from the Mexican Government and a copy of proceedings in
a Mexican Court finding that the crime was duly proved against the appellant
and ordering his arrest, many pages of evidence being appended.
Id.; see Wiehl, supra note 10, at 748 (“[T]he Court noted with approval that by the time
of the extradition hearing, many pages of evidence had been appended to the
complaint.”). Relying on Fernandez, the court in United States ex rel. Petrushansky v.
Marasco, 325 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1963), ruled that an extradition complaint filed by an
Assistant United States Attorney without personal knowledge was legally valid. Id. at
564. Furthermore, while the complaint failed to specify the details of the crime (a
murder) with which petitioner had been charged in Mexico, under the treaty, “each
government [was] obligated, upon being notified by the other that it [had] issued a
warrant of arrest, to procure the provisional arrest of fugitives and to detain them until
supporting papers [were] received.” Id. That understanding, the court determined, appeared
to contemplate the issuance of provisional arrest warrants under the circumstances
presented in Marasco. Id.
88. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 744-48 (discussing cases).
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that the fugitive had been charged with an extraditable offense is not
clear from these opinions. The more recent cases, when analyzing
requests for provisional arrest warrants, have sought to shed light on this
question.
B. Recent Cases
The first case in the last thirty years to question implicitly the
constitutionality of a provisional arrest warrant based on a telephonic
communication that the fugitive had been charged with an extraditable
crime is United States v. Williams.89 In Williams, defendant was arrested
on the basis of a telephonic communication from Canadian authorities
that he had been charged with violations of Canadian criminal law.90
The treaty between the United States and Canada provided for the
provisional arrest of a person based on an application that contained a
description of the person sought, the warrant for arrest which had been
issued by the requesting country, “and such further information, if any,
as would be necessary to justify the issue of a warrant of arrest had the
offense been committed . . . in the territory of the requested State.”91 In
Williams, there was no indication in the opinion that the warrant was
issued on anything other than the existence of the Canadian warrant.92
While the principal focus in Williams was whether defendant was
entitled to be released on bail pending his extradition hearing, the court
also expressed concern about how defendant came to be detained in the
first place. Specifically, the court noted that sustaining the government’s
position of no bail pending the hearing would deprive the defendant “of
his liberty for 30 days or more, without any showing and determination
of reasonable grounds for commitment, and without an opportunity to
show that his attendance at that hearing [could] be reasonably assured by
bail.”93 Although subsequently reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, the district court granted Williams bail,
rejecting the government’s contention that the interest in fulfilling treaty
89. 480 F. Supp. 482 (D. Mass. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st
Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 483. In its opinion, the district court referred to Williams as “defendant”
and the discussion above adopts that reference.
91. Id. at 485 n.1 (quoting Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and
Canada, art. 11, Dec. 3, 1971, 991 T.I.A.S. No. 8237).
92. See id. at 483.
93. Id. at 485.
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obligations overrode the “intrusion on personal liberty” presented by his
detention.94
In United States v. Wiebe,95 petitioner, a Canadian national, was arrested
in the United States following the execution of a provisional arrest
warrant.96 The basis for the provisional arrest warrant was a Spanish
warrant which had been issued in connection with the murder of two
Colombian nationals in Barcelona, Spain.97 Following an extradition hearing,
at which petitioner testified, the magistrate concluded that there was
probable cause that he had committed the murders in Spain and ordered
him extraditable.98 Petitioner thereafter contested this finding in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus which the district court denied.99
On appeal, petitioner argued that his arrest was unlawful because it
was not supported by probable cause.100 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this contention. Citing section
3184, the court ruled that a magistrate could “issue a provisional arrest
warrant upon a showing in a sworn complaint of a treaty of extradition
between the United States and any foreign country, and that the person
sought committed in the foreign jurisdiction one of the crimes set forth
in the treaty.”101 In Wiebe, the complaint alleged that petitioner was sought
for murder and that murder was an extraditable offense, therefore, the
magistrate had not erred in issuing the warrant.102
A different result was reached by the court in Caltagirone v. Grant.103
In Caltagirone, under the terms of its extradition treaty with the United
States, Italy applied for the “provisional arrest” of one of its nationals
pending a formal request for his extradition.104 The sworn complaint
prepared by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York simply alleged that Italian warrants charging fraudulent bankruptcy
and embezzlement had been issued for petitioner’s arrest.105 On the day
of his arrest, petitioner moved to quash the warrant on the grounds that it
94. Id. at 485-88.
95. 733 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 550.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 552.
99. Id. The district court had also denied an earlier petition in which Wiebe
challenged his detention on the grounds that extradition documents had not been
delivered in a timely fashion under the governing treaty. Id.
100. Id. at 553. Petitioner also raised other contentions relating to the determination
at the hearing that there was probable cause that he had committed the crimes for which
his extradition was sought and the formal transmission of extradition documents under
the treaty, both of which the court rejected. Id. at 552-54.
101. Id. at 553-54.
102. Id. at 554.
103. 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
104. Id. at 743.
105. Id.
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had been issued without a probable cause determination and the district
court denied the motion.106 Petitioner thereafter renewed his motion and
also sought a writ of habeas corpus, both of which were denied.107 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed.108
The court began its analysis by noting that Article XIII of the
extradition treaty with Italy contained four requirements in connection
with the application for a provisional arrest warrant: a description of the
person sought; an indication that a request for extradition would be
forthcoming; the existence of an arrest warrant in the state seeking
extradition; and “such further information, if any, as would be necessary
to justify the issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense been
committed . . . in the territory of the requested Party.”109 Had the offense for
which Italy sought extradition—fraudulent bankruptcy—been committed in
the United States, probable cause would have been required before the
issuance of an arrest warrant for one alleged to have committed that
offense.110 Accordingly, since the warrant for petitioner’s provisional
arrest was based solely on the existence of an Italian arrest warrant, it
did not conform with the treaty’s requirements.111
With respect to the government’s contention that the probable cause
determination was reserved under Article XI of the treaty to the
extradition hearing pursuant to a formal request for extradition, and not
to the decision involving the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant,112
the court ruled that while these proceedings “differ[ed] in some way, the
difference [did] not lie in the requirement of probable cause.”113 In
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 750.
109. Id. at 744 (internal quotation omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 744-47.
112. While Article XI of the treaty did not expressly provide for the presentation of
evidence before a judge or magistrate establishing probable cause, the court reasoned
that it was “presumably because 18 U.S.C. § 3184 already require[d] such a proceeding
in all formal requests for extradition.” Id. at 745.
113. Id. at 747. The court explained:
Article XI and Article XIII both require a showing of probable cause, but the
proceedings they contemplate are different in several crucial respects. Article
XIII requires “information,” and lists no formalities attending its provision by
the applying state. . . . Article XI, on the other hand, requires “evidence,” a
word which necessarily implies a greater degree of formality in procedures
than “information.” Unlike Article XIII, Article XI requires both certified
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short, by interpreting the “further information” language in the treaty to
incorporate a requirement of probable cause, in addition to the existence
of an arrest warrant from the requesting state, the court in Caltagirone
was able to avoid the question of whether, in the context of a provisional
arrest warrant, absent such a clause, the Fourth Amendment required an
independent showing of probable cause.114
In In re Russell,115 Colombia sought a provisional arrest warrant for
petitioner in connection with a fraudulent transaction in which thirteen
million dollars was transferred from a Colombian government account at
the Chase Manhattan Bank in London.116 After the magistrate issued the
warrant and petitioner was arrested, he sought relief through a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus which the district court denied.117
On appeal, petitioner argued that the provisional arrest clause under the
treaty between the United States and Colombia was unconstitutional
because it provided for the arrest of American citizens without a
determination of probable cause.118 Additionally, petitioner maintained
that his arrest and detention were not supported by probable cause and
therefore violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.119 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these contentions.
The Fifth Circuit initially noted that the court in Caltagirone had
construed the treaty at issue there as requiring probable cause in connection

Id.

depositions establishing probable cause and a copy of the actual warrant of
arrest issued by the magistrate in the requesting state. . . . Moreover, under
Article XI the requesting states must “prov[e],” not allege, that the relator is
the person named in the warrants, and must provide an extensive documentary
appendix to its request setting forth, inter alia, its law defining the offense,
prescribing the punishment, and setting the time period in which charges may
be brought.

114. Id. In United States ex rel. Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.
1963), the court held that a warrant for a “provisional arrest” could be issued on the basis
of a complaint that Marasco had been charged with murder in Mexico. Id. at 564. The
court in Caltagirone distinguished Marasco on the grounds that the Fourth Amendment
issue had not been raised and also that “evidence establishing probable cause was
produced.” Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 748 n.19.
115. 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 1216.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1217. That clause read in part:
In case of urgency either Contracting Party may request, through the
diplomatic channel, the provisional detention of an accused or convicted
person. The application shall contain a description of the person sought, a
statement of intention to present the request for extradition of the person
sought . . . and a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgment
of conviction against that person.
Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and Colombia, U.S.-Colom.,
art. 11(1), Sept. 14, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 97-8 (1981).
119. Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217.
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with the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant.120 Assuming, without
deciding, that the extradition treaty with Colombia also required a
showing of probable cause, the court in Russell found that the evidence
presented to the magistrate had met that standard.121 This evidence had
consisted of the sworn complaint describing the transaction, letters from
petitioner to the Consul General of Colombia about it (and the Consul’s
response), and petitioner’s testimony.122
In Sahagian v. United States,123 an American citizen who had been
detained in Spain under an extradition treaty, returned to the United
States, and then released after the original charges were dropped,
brought suit against a number of federal officials alleging that his arrest
and detention had violated his constitutional rights.124 The treaty
between the United States and Spain contained a “further information”
clause in connection with a request for a provisional arrest similar to that
in Caltagirone.125 In rejecting Sahagian’s contention that his arrest was
unlawful because he had not first been indicted, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed in a footnote that there was
some tension between Russell and Caltagirone over the probable cause
showing in the context of provisional arrest warrants.126 In the case
before it, however, since Sahagian’s arrest was supported by probable
cause,127 the court did not need to “venture into this debate or decide
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1217-18. In Russell, the magistrate issued a warrant for petitioner’s
arrest based on the complaint filed by the U.S. Attorney alleging that petitioner was a
fugitive from justice and that he had been charged under a warrant with violations of the
Colombian Penal Code. In re Russell, 647 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 1986), aff’d,
805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986). The complaint enumerated the details of the acts charged
in the warrant and also included petitioner’s description and address. Id. at 1050-51. One
week after petitioner’s arrest, the magistrate held a hearing at which he took evidence
and ruled that there was probable cause for petitioner’s continued detention. Id. at 1045,
1050-51.
123. 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988).
124. Id. at 510-12.
125. Id. at 511 (“An application for a provisional arrest is required to contain a
description of the person sought, an indication of intent to extradite, a statement of the
existence of an arrest warrant, and such ‘further information, if any, as may be required
by the requested Party.’”).
126. Id. at 513 n.4.
127. The court ruled that the treaty did not deprive petitioner of any constitutional
rights since federal officials had secured his “provisional arrest and detention pending
extradition after obtaining an arrest warrant from a magistrate based upon a showing of
probable cause.” Id. at 513.
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whether the debate even [had] any applicability when the United States
[sought] the provisional arrest and detention of a person.”128
The most recent circuit court opinion addressing the application of the
probable cause standard to a provisional arrest warrant is Parretti v.
United States.129 Although that opinion was subsequently withdrawn by
the Ninth Circuit when, sitting en banc, it determined that the appeal
should be dismissed because of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine,130
the court’s analysis and treatment of the issue may influence or guide
judges or magistrates in the future, and thus, merits discussion here.131
In Parretti, petitioner, an Italian citizen, was arrested pursuant to a
provisional arrest warrant under the extradition treaty between the United
States and France.132 The warrant was based on the complaint of an Assistant
United States Attorney acting on behalf of the Government of France.133
The complaint alleged that petitioner had been charged in an arrest
warrant issued in France with various business related crimes, that the
crimes were extraditable offenses under the treaty, and that France had
requested petitioner’s provisional arrest.134 Neither the French warrant,
affidavits, nor any “other competent evidence” were attached to the
complaint.135
Following his arrest, petitioner argued at his bail hearing and on his
habeas petition to the district court that the provisional warrant violated
the Fourth Amendment on two grounds. First, it was not based on any
128. Id. at 513 n.4; see United States v. Malcolm, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1999) (finding there was no need to decide whether probable cause
was required for a provisional arrest because the recitation of facts in the complaint
established it). Sahagian, of course, did not involve section 3184 since the arrest took
place in Spain. Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 510-11.
129. 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). An earlier version of the Parretti
opinion is found at 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). Given the en banc court’s ruling,
the panel decision has no precedential value. See In re Kyung Joon Kim, No. CV
04-3886-ABC (PLA), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12444, at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2004)
(recognizing that the earlier Parretti opinion “is not the law in [the Ninth] Circuit”).
130. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 509. Developed in the late nineteenth century in the
context of criminal appeals, see United States v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency,
32 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1994), the fugitive disentitlement establishes that a
“fugitive from justice may not seek relief from the judicial system whose authority he or
she evades.” Martha B. Stolley, Note, Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive
Disentitlement Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 752 (1997). Equitable in
nature, see In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1995), the doctrine has been applied
in criminal and civil cases, at both the trial and appellate levels. See Pesin v. Rodriguez,
244 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2001).
131. See Olson, supra note 7, at 167-68 (“Despite the withdrawal, the detrimental
impact of the panel’s decision on the future of international extradition is certain because
of the important constitutional questions it raises.”).
132. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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evidence that he had committed any of the offenses with which he had
been charged in the French warrant.136 Second, the magistrate judge had
failed to make a probable cause determination.137 The district court
denied the petition and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the government had failed to
make the necessary evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe
that petitioner had committed an extraditable crime.138
The government initially argued that the rule of judicial non-inquiry139
prohibited the court from looking behind the foreign warrant.140 The
court rejected this contention finding that it represented an “unprecedented
extension of the rule of judicial non-inquiry to a justiciable case or
controversy.”141 The court then determined that in contrast to the treaties at
issue in Caltagirone and Sahagian, the treaty with France could not
“fairly be interpreted as requiring a showing of probable cause in addition to
the existence of a foreign arrest warrant.”142 Similarly, the court found
that section 3184 could not fairly be read as requiring a showing of
probable cause in connection with a provisional arrest warrant.143
136. Id.
137. Id. at 762.
138. Id. at 763. The court also ruled that petitioner’s detention without bail violated
his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 763-64.
139. The rule of non-inquiry provides that “[a]n extraditing court will generally not
inquire into the procedures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in the
requesting country.” Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th
Cir. 1983); accord In re Chan Seong-I, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1157 (D.N.M. 2004). The
rationale for the rule is that such issues “properly fall[] within the exclusive purview of
the executive branch.” Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980)); accord Mainero v. Gregg,
164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally Jacques Semmelman, Federal
Courts, The Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition
Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991) (arguing for strict application of the rule
of non-inquiry in international extradition proceedings).
140. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 764-67.
141. Id. at 765 (“In this case, the government invites us to extend the rule of judicial
non-inquiry to the paradigmatic justiciable question whether an arrest warrant has been
issued in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We respectfully decline the government’s
invitation.”).
142. Id. at 769.
143. See id. at 770. The court in Parretti observed:
Section 3184 allows an arrest warrant to issue on the basis of a “complaint . . .
charging [the person to be arrested] with having committed” an extraditable
offense. Once again, all § 3184 requires is a showing that the fugitive has been
charged with committing an extraditable crime. Section 3184 does not require
an independent judicial determination of probable cause to believe the fugitive
committed the offense. Under § 3184, the purpose of the arrest is to allow the
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Lastly, unlike Russell, the court determined it could not avoid the Fourth
Amendment question presented by finding, on the basis of the record,
that petitioner’s arrest was supported by probable cause.144
Confronted with the constitutional question that Caltagirone, Russell,
and Sahagian had “managed to avoid,” the court in Parretti held that the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause could not “be interpreted as allowing a
lesser standard for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing treaty
obligations than for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing our own
domestic laws.”145 It concluded that the court in Wiebe had gone “astray”
when it upheld the issuance of the warrant there based on a complaint
that alleged petitioner had been charged with an extraditable crime.146
Having determined that the treaty with France and section 3184 violated
the Fourth Amendment, to the extent they permitted the issuance of
provisional arrest warrants without an independent judicial determination of
probable cause, the court then turned to the evidence which had been
presented.147 That evidence, the panel concluded, was insufficient to
establish probable cause because it consisted of facts alleged in the
French warrant which were not supported by “affidavits, deposition
testimony, or other competent evidence.”148

Id.

fugitive to be brought before a magistrate so that the “evidence of criminality
may [then] be heard and considered.” In other words, § 3184 contemplates an
arrest so that thereafter, at the extradition hearing, the “evidence of criminality,”
i.e., the existence of probable cause, may be heard.

144. See id. at 770.
145. Id. at 771.
146. Id. at 772. The court also found United States ex rel. Petrushansky v.
Marasco, 325 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1963), unpersuasive because that case had not addressed
the constitutional question. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 771-72.
147. See id. at 773.
148. Id. at 774 (“In applying for the warrant to arrest Parretti, all the government
presented were the French magistrate’s allegations of fact.”); id. at 775 (“[The
allegations] may have been relayed to the State Department by a reliable source, but
those allegations without supporting affidavits or other competent evidence provide no
basis for a judicial determination whether there is probable cause to believe Parretti
committed an extraditable crime.”). The court recognized that in Yordi v. Nolte, 215
U.S. 227 (1909), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a complaint in an
extradition proceeding must be sworn to by persons having personal knowledge of the
crime alleged. Yordi, 215 U.S. at 230-31. There, however, the magistrate had before
him evidence consisting of the record and evidence in the foreign proceedings, which
included the depositions of witnesses. Id. at 228-29.
In In re Orellana, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10380, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2000),
citing Parretti, the court determined that the provisional arrest warrant had been issued
in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because “neither the source of the
information nor the grounds for the [prosecutor’s] belief [were] provided in the
complaint.”
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C. Discussion
It is well settled that at an extradition hearing under section 3184, the
controlling standard is probable cause.149 This is so even though section
3184 only refers to “evidence of criminality.”150 Furthermore, in
applying this standard to extradition hearings, neither the Supreme Court
nor any lower federal court has relied on the Fourth Amendment.151 But
what about a warrant for the provisional arrest of a fugitive so that his
appearance can be secured at the hearing? Must that warrant be based
on probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, and if so, probable
cause of what?
As demonstrated by the discussion above, while the early Supreme
Court cases provided guidance relating to the legal sufficiency of
extradition complaints,152 it is only recently that courts have confronted
the question of whether a provisional arrest warrant needs to be
supported by probable cause in the traditional Fourth Amendment
sense.153 In that regard, the cases reveal that when the treaty allowing
for a provisional arrest contained a “further information” clause,154 or
when the record established probable cause to issue the warrant,155

149. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 51-52, 54.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000) (stating that judges review extradition warrants “to
the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered”); cf. Olson, supra
note 7, at 176 (“[T]he statute lacks an explicit requirement that the government make a
showing of probable cause for . . . extradition.”).
151. See Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[T]he
requirement that there be probable cause in order to extradite ‘has not yet been
interpreted as emanating from the Fourth Amendment.’”); Olson, supra note 7, at 176
(“Despite the absence of an explicit requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court has inferred
from the statutory language a requirement of showing probable cause for extradition
purposes, although no court has held the basis to be the Fourth Amendment.”).
152. See Powers, supra note 13, at 302 (“Early Supreme Court cases, while
confusing, seemed to support the proposition that complaints could be based only on
information and ‘belief.’”); Wiehl, supra note 10, at 745 (“While the Court offered
language which appeared to favor a requirement that warrants be based on attached
depositions or other documentary evidence, it also offered conflicting language
suggesting that warrants could issue merely on ‘information and belief.’”).
153. See supra Part IV.B.
154. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1980) (“In our view, the
language of Article XIII so clearly demands a showing of probable cause before any
warrant for provisional arrest may issue, that we need not reach the constitutional
question.”).
155. See Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“Because there was a showing of probable cause to support [petitioner’s] arrest and
detention, we need not venture into this debate . . . .”).
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whether or not the treaty contained such a clause,156 courts declined to
decide whether, under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause needed to
be shown for a provisional arrest warrant to issue.157 In Parretti, where
those considerations were not present, the Ninth Circuit ruled, in a
decision which was later withdrawn, that the Fourth Amendment did not
“allow[] a lesser standard for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing
treaty obligations than for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing our
own domestic laws.”158
Implicit or explicit in those recent opinions was an application of the
probable cause standard in the traditional domestic criminal sense, that
is, probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that
the petitioner committed it.159 One circuit court opinion from that period,
however, can be interpreted to have applied the probable cause standard,
but in a different context. In Wiebe,160 relying on section 3184, the
Eighth Circuit ruled that a magistrate could issue a provisional arrest
warrant upon a showing in a sworn complaint that a person sought to be
extradited had been charged with an extraditable offense.161 The complaint
there simply had alleged that petitioner was sought for murder and that
murder was an extraditable offense.162 This formulation of probable
cause, which looks to the existence of a treaty and the assertion that the

156. See In re Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Assuming without
deciding that the Treaty requires a showing of probable cause to support a provisional
arrest before an extradition hearing, we agree with the district court that the magistrate
had enough evidence before him to show probable cause to detain [the petitioner].”);
United States v. Malcolm, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1999)
(finding there was no need to decide whether probable cause was required for a
provisional arrest because the recitation of facts in the complaint established it).
157. Wiehl, supra note 10, at 758 (“In the past ten years, several appellate panels of
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have
questioned the constitutionality of allowing a provisional arrest warrant to issue without
a prior evidentiary showing of probable cause but have managed to avoid deciding the
constitutional issue.”); See Russo, supra note 76, at 1083 (“Most courts have avoided the
question by interpreting the language of the corresponding extradition treaty as requiring
probable cause.”).
158. Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 771 (9th Cir. 1997), appeal denied,
rev’d en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint in Parretti alleged that
petitioner had been charged in an arrest warrant issued in France with various business
related crimes, that the crimes were extraditable offenses under the treaty, and that
France had requested petitioner’s provisional arrest. Id. at 761.
159. See id. at 776; Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 513; Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217-18;
Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 744-45.
160. 733 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1984).
161. Id. at 553-54. The court in Parretti observed that while the Wiebe court
correctly cited the applicable standard, it “then went astray and inexplicably upheld a
warrant even though it was based on a complaint that alleged only that Wiebe was
charged with an extraditable crime.” Parretti, 122 F.3d at 772.
162. Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554.
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fugitive has been charged with or has committed an extraditable offense,
is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.163
As noted earlier, probable cause to arrest or search can arise outside
the domestic criminal warrant context.164 In other words, a “warrant
application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced
and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.”165 Illustrative of
this principle are material witness and FISA warrants.166 In terms of the
present discussion, the former provides a useful analogy.167
Under the federal material witness statute,168 a warrant for the arrest of
a material witness may issue if there has been a showing, by way of
affidavit and based on probable cause, that the witness has material
knowledge of a crime, and that his or her presence is unlikely to be
achieved by subpoena.169 In a similar vein, section 3184 permits the
issuance of a warrant “upon complaint made under oath, charging any
person found within [the magistrate or judge’s] jurisdiction, with having
committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of
the crimes provided for by . . . treaty or convention.”170 As with material
witness warrants, and supported by the court’s ruling in Wiebe, a
determination of probable cause in the provisional arrest context should
not be measured in the traditional domestic criminal warrant sense
because the purpose of the seizure is not the initiation of a criminal
prosecution, but rather, a determination of whether the fugitive should be

163. See In re Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D. Tex. 1957) (“Under Section 3184
of Title 18, a judge or commissioner may issue a warrant . . . if (1) there is a treaty or
convention for extradition and (2) a complaint is made under oath charging [the person
sought to be extradited] with having committed in [the foreign country] any of the crimes
provided for by such Treaty or Convention.”).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
165. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
167. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 788-89 (discussing why material witness warrants
provide a useful analogy).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
169. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n
application for a material witness warrant under § 3144 must establish probable cause to
believe that (1) the witness’s testimony is material, and (2) it may become impracticable
to secure the presence of the witness by subpoena.”); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d
933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000).
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extradited pursuant to the foreign government’s request for his or her
extradition.171
This formulation is consistent with the governmental and individual
interests at stake. Under extradition treaties, the United States has a
compelling interest in maintaining foreign relations by swiftly apprehending
fugitives sought by a foreign government so that a proper determination
can be made as to their extraditability.172 Conversely, the liberty interest
of a fugitive in an extradition proceeding, which is considered sui generis, is
not unqualified. In other words, it is an interest already burdened by the
fact that a foreign government has initiated criminal proceedings against
him. Therefore, at the provisional arrest stage, the object of the probable
cause inquiry should be limited to the existence of a foreign warrant
charging an extraditable offense.173
But even if a showing beyond the existence of the foreign warrant
charging an extraditable offense is necessary to comply with the Fourth
Amendment at the provisional arrest stage, what should be the nature of
that showing? The statutory scheme governing extradition requests “has
never by its terms required an evidentiary submission as a predicate for
the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant.”174 Further, Caltagirone
and Russell, and to some degree, Sahagian, recognized that the probable
cause showing underlying a provisional arrest warrant could be more

171. See Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[The extradition
hearing is] essentially a ‘preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made
out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding
nation.’”). While section 3184 does not mention probable cause, the court in Wiebe read
that requirement into the statute. See United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir.
1984). The material witness statute similarly does not identify probable cause as the
standard governing the issuance of material witness warrants. See also § 3144. Courts
interpreting that statute likewise have found that for a warrant to issue, there must be a
determination of probable cause. See Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 64; Bacon, 449 F.2d at
943; Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 628.
Under the Bail Reform Act, once arrested, a material witness may be released on
personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond, released subject to certain
conditions, or detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)-(c), (e) (2000). In extradition cases, the Act
is inapplicable and there is a presumption against bail which can be overcome if the
person sought to be extradited demonstrates “special circumstances.” Wright v. Henkel,
190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903); In re Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986); In re
Mironescu, 296 F. Supp. 2d 632, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
172. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 790 (“The case can certainly be made that in
extradition cases the government has interests that extend well beyond mere reciprocity.
These interests include peace and commerce with other nations.”).
173. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 553-54; In re Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D. Tex.
1957); see also In re Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A request
for provisional arrest need only be accompanied by a declaration that an arrest warrant
exists . . . .”).
174. Wiehl, supra note 10, at 744.
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informal than the showing at the extradition hearing.175 This takes into
account the realities of the extradition proceeding at that stage, when
documents are being collected and prepared in connection with the
presentation of the formal request for extradition leading to the
extradition hearing.176 Specifically, a sworn complaint setting forth the
facts alleged in the foreign warrant should be sufficient to enable the
magistrate or judge to make a probable cause finding that the fugitive
committed the charged offense for the limited purpose of his detention
pending the extradition hearing.177
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment provides in part that “no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”178 Provisional arrest warrants issued pursuant to the request of a
foreign government under an extradition treaty must comply with that
constitutional command. As demonstrated by the discussion above,
given the nature of extradition proceedings, the object of the probable
cause determination at the provisional warrant stage should be the existence
175. See Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988); Russell,
805 F.2d at 1217; Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975). See generally Nathaniel A. Persily,
Note, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 407, 416-17
(1998) (“Though no court has specified it as such, the probable cause showing at the
stage of provisional arrest is what might be termed a ‘second order’ probable cause
showing. The government is establishing probable cause that probable cause of
criminality will be established at the extradition hearing.”).
176. As noted by one commentator:
Most extradition treaties specify a deadline following (rather than prior to) the
fugitive’s arrest by which the requesting country must gather and transmit
through the diplomatic channel the various charging documents, affidavits,
ambassadorial or consular certifications, translations, and apostilles which the
government will in turn submit to the court for consideration at a formal
extradition hearing on the government’s request for an order certifying the
extraditability of the fugitive.
Wiehl, supra note 10, at 750.
177. The form complaint found in the Department of Justice’s Criminal Resource
Manual for provisional arrests contains a section for a description of the facts upon
which the foreign warrant was based. See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 4, §
616; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (“If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the
complaint establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant to an officer
authorized to execute it.”).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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of a foreign warrant charging an extraditable offense. Even if the Fourth
Amendment requires more, however, the showing should be less formal
than that at the extradition hearing, and the facts alleged in the foreign
warrant should be sufficient to support the detention of the fugitive
pending the formal request for extradition and the subsequent hearing.
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